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THE MISSING PERSON IN THE CONVERSATION: 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, SR., AND THE DIALOGICAL SELF 
David E. Leary 
University of Richmond 
 
ABSTRACT. Wiley (2006) has argued for a relationship between pragmatism and the 
dialogical self, noting that both are rooted in the thought of William James and Charles S. 
Peirce.  This commentary delves into the possible connection between James’s and Peirce’s 
ideas as well as the probable influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., on the development of 
dialogical conceptions of the self. 
 
 
Norbert Wiley (2006) has written a stimulating piece on the relations between 
pragmatism and the dialogical self.  It provides a very useful, broad-stroke portrait of 
these relations, and it raises many questions worthy of further exploration and 
discussion.  For someone with historical interests, like myself, it invites additional 
consideration of the origins of the dialogical premises held by Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1839-1914) as well as by William James (1842-1910), the two major sources of 
American pragmatism identified and discussed by Wiley.  Hence, his article prompted 
me to look more deeply into a matter that I had neglected in writing a long chapter on 
James’s views on the self (Leary, 1990).  
In that chapter, I noted that James, in making his now-classic distinction 
between the I and the Me, had indicated that he meant “nothing mysterious and 
unexampled” by these terms.  They were, he said, “at bottom only names of emphasis” 
(Leary, 1990, p. 107; James, 1890/1981, Vol. 1, p. 324).  Nevertheless, emphases are 
significant, I said, and in this case they provided a theoretical structure that allowed 
James to treat a vast array of issues that “touched off many lines of later conceptual 
development” (p. 106).  I went on to discuss those lines of subsequent development but 
never looked in the other direction – never searched for the possible origins of James’s 
apparently original way of speaking about the I and Me aspects of the self.  In short, I 
did not pick up on the implications of James’s comment that his proposition of the I-Me 
distinction was “nothing…unexampled.”  Prompted by Wiley’s article, I have now 
searched for previous examples, and I am happy to have this opportunity to share what I 
have found. 
It seems clear that Peirce’s notions about I, It, and Thou were instigated by his 
study of Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795/1965), as Wiley 
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has suggested.  I will refrain from discussing this further because Wiley has indicated 
that he will do so in a forthcoming article.  It also seems very probable that Peirce’s I-
Thou-It distinction led to, or at least melded with, his later notions regarding inner 
speech.  However, those notions, so far as I can tell, developed considerably later; they 
were less explicitly formulated by Peirce than some have implied (though Wiley 
himself was explicit in admitting that “Peirce has no treatise or extended discussion of 
inner speech”); and they had no demonstrable impact on James’s thinking.  I deny any 
influence in this regard even though (a) Peirce was a crucial stimulant to James’s 
intellectual development from the time that James became a fellow student at Harvard’s 
Lawrence Scientific School in 1861, (b) Peirce shared his ideas of I-Thou-It with James, 
and (c) James considered these ideas significant enough to record in a notebook, 
explicitly attributing them to Peirce (James, 1862).  Nonetheless, as Peirce’s own 
writings of the time and James’s notebook entry make clear, Peirce’s triadic distinction 
was then a schematic form of analysis, not a theory of inner speech.  Exactly when, 
how, and to what extent that theory emerged is not clear, at least to me.  Whether or not 
one might call it implicit at an earlier time, it seems not to have been articulated at all 
(even in Peirce’s unpublished notebooks, so far as I have been able to determine) for a 
number of decades, and there is absolutely no evidence that it had any influence on 
James’s use of I and Me in The Principles of Psychology (1890/1981).  While it is true 
that as early as 1859 Peirce included “me” among the list of words associated with the 
“I” term of his triad (e.g., Fisch, 1982, p. xxviii), this listing had no conceptual 
significance whatsoever, either for a theory of inner speech or for James’s I-Me 
distinction.1 
However, that doesn’t mean that James’s use of I-Me in The Principles of 
Psychology was without precedent.  At the very time that Peirce was developing his I-
Thou-It distinction, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. (1809-1894), the well-known literary 
                                       
1 To the extent that Peirce commented on inner speech, using concepts of “I” and “me” (or 
“myself”), it seems that his fascination with Shakespeare – especially his familiarity with the 
dialogical soliloques and monologues in Shakespeare’s works – may have been more relevant 
than his study of Schiller.  As he wrote in “Pragmatism” (1907/1998), anyone who thinks back 
on an experience of self-reflection “will remark that his deliberations took a dialogic form.”  In 
addition, anyone who observes “the sort of mind that is least sophisticated” will note that it 
often “betray[s] itself by its language,” as when it uses “such expressions as ‘I says to myself, 
says I’” or when it is heard “audibly talking to himself, like Launcelot Gobbo,” a character 
depicted in The Merchant of Venice (Act 2, Scene 2) by “the subtle psychologist who created 
him” (p. 402).  Long before he wrote this, Peirce had read James’s Principles of Psychology and 
acknowledged James as “the first [greatest] psychologist living or that ever lived” (Peirce, 
1902/1935).  So, instead of Peirce possibly influencing James’s incipient treatment of the 
dialogical self in the Principles, it is entirely possible that James’s treatment of the self in that 
work influenced Peirce’s later description of inner speech.  Interestingly, Francis Child, the 
same professor who stimulated Peirce’s study of Schiller, almost certainly contributed also to 
his appreciation of Shakespeare. 
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writer, social commentator, and medical doctor, published his Autocrat of the Breakfast 
Table (1858/1892a).  In that extremely popular collection of imaginary conversations at 
a Boston boardinghouse, previously published in The Atlantic Monthly, Holmes put 
these words in the mouth of the Autocrat: 
Talking is one of the fine arts, – the noblest, the most important, and the 
most difficult….It is not easy, at the best, for two persons talking together to 
make the most of each other’s thoughts, there are so many of them….When 
John and Thomas, for instance, are talking together, it is natural enough that 
among the six there should be more or less confusion and misapprehension. 
(p. 52) 
When the Autocrat’s boardinghouse listeners fail to understand his reference to six 
interlocutors, the Autocrat explains: 
There are at least six personalities distinctly to be recognized as taking part in 
between that dialogue between John and Thomas. 
Three Johns. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1. The real John; known only to his Maker. 
2. John’s ideal John; never the real one, and 
often very unlike him. 
3. Thomas’s ideal John; never the real John, 
nor John’s John, but often very unlike 
either. 
 
Three Thomases. 
  
  
  
1. The real Thomas. 
2. Thomas’s ideal Thomas. 
3. John’s ideal Thomas. 
 
Only one of the three Johns is taxed; only one can be weighed on a platform-
balance; but the other two are just as important in the conversation. (p. 53) 
After some additional comments, the Autocrat concludes: 
It follows, that, until a man can be found who knows himself as his Maker 
knows him, or who sees himself as others see him, there must be at least six 
persons engaged in every dialogue between two.  Of these, the least 
important, philosophically speaking, is the one that we have called the real 
person.  No wonder two disputants often get angry, when there are six of 
them talking and listening all at the same time. (pp. 53-54) 
These remarkable comments came from someone who was and still is 
acknowledged as one of the greatest of 19th-century conversationalists.  But Holmes 
was more than a conversationalist and perceptive writer, he was also the former Dean of 
the Harvard Medical School (1847-1853) and the school’s current Parkman Professor of 
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Anatomy and Physiology (1847-1882).  More to the point, he was one of William 
James’s teachers – even one of those who examined him for his M.D. degree – as well 
as an intimate family friend and the father of one of his closest friends, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.  Even more significantly, just a year after James received his degree, 
Holmes delivered a widely noted Phi Beta Kappa address at Harvard on “Mechanism in 
Thought and Morals” (1870/1892b).  In that address, after reviewing contemporary 
research on the “two brains” (the two cerebral hemispheres) in humans and the 
implications of this research for understanding double consciousness, Holmes harkened 
back to his discussion in the Autocrat:  
We are all more or less improvisators.  We all have a double, who is wiser 
and better than we are, and who puts thoughts into our heads, and words into 
our mouths.  Do we not all commune with our hearts upon our beds?  Do we 
not all divide ourselves, and go to buffets on questions of right or wrong, of 
wisdom or folly?  Who or what is it that resolves the stately parliament of 
the day, with all its forms and conventionalities and pretences, and the great 
Me presiding, into the committee of the whole, with Conscience in the chair, 
that holds its solemn session through the watches of the night? (p. 289) 
It would strain credulity to think that James was not familiar with Holmes’s address, 
particularly since it dealt with a matter of crucial importance to him – the nature and 
role of cerebral mechanism, especially in relation to human thought and experience.  In 
any case, James is likely to have known Holmes’s thoughts on these matters through the 
classes he took and the many conversations he had with him.  Hence, Holmes’s 
treatment of the multiple aspects of self is almost certainly one of the “examples,” 
probably the primary example, that James had in mind when he suggested that his I-Me 
distinction was not entirely original.  Indeed, Holmes himself saw a connection between 
his own earlier works and James’s way of discussing the self.  As he wrote in 1890:  
I have not ventured very often nor very deeply into the field of metaphysics, 
but if I were disposed to make any claim in that direction, it would be the 
recognition of...my studies of the second member in the partnership of I-
My-Self & Co.  (Holmes, 1890/1892c, pp. 165-166)  
As he goes on to make clear, Holmes was referring in these comments to 
James’s article on “The Hidden Self” (1890/1983) rather than his chapter on the self in 
The Principles of Psychology (published in the same year), and the emphasis of 
Holmes’s remarks was placed, not on James’s I-Me distinction, but on the different 
“layers” of the mind and “the distinct, separable, independent individualities,” i.e., 
multiple selves, that James treated in “The Hidden Self.”  Holmes said that he had never 
seen these distinct “individualities” described as well as James had done (p. 166).  In 
fact, I would contend that James’s “Hidden Self” provided even clearer manifestations 
of the dialogical self than were apparent in his discussion of the I-Me distinction in The 
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Principles of Psychology.  Still, the point at hand is that James’s I-Me distinction, 
apparently traceable to Holmes’s “I-My-Self & Co.,” was a direct precedent of 
contemporary dialogical modes of analysis, as Wiley has shown.2 
In conclusion, it is relevant to note that after Holmes called James’s description 
of multiple selves the best that he knew, James returned the compliment, placing 
Holmes’s name on a short list of “geniuses of the community in which I live” and 
remembering him, personally, as “one of the great big and important memories of my 
younger days” (James, 1895/1987, p. 512; James, 1894/1999, p. 554).  Interestingly, 
James, like Holmes, was a very sociable person and, by all accounts, a remarkable 
                                       
2 Sometime late in life, Holmes recorded some notes in anticipation of writing an 
autobiography.  In those notes, published posthumously (Holmes, 1896), Holmes wrote:  
“Though fond of society at times, I have always been good company to myself, either by day or 
night.  The ‘I’ and the ‘me’ of my double personality keep up endless dialogues, as is, I 
suppose, the case with most people, – sometimes using very harsh language to each other.  One 
of them, I am sorry to say, is very apt to be abusive and to treat the other like an idiot, with 
expressions which, if uttered, would make a very bad figure in these pages” (p. 43).  While 
James could not have read this passage before writing The Principles of Psychology, it is quite 
possible that he had heard Holmes utter similar thoughts, inside or outside the classroom, long 
before he formulated his own version of the I-Me distinction.  Although his own definition and 
use of I and Me are somewhat different from Holmes’s, it is relevant to note that it was not 
unusual for James to adopt others’ concepts and terms and then turn them to his own purposes.  
He was generally aware of what he was doing and was always generous in giving credit to his 
original sources; at times, however, he was unaware – or perhaps felt he had transformed ideas 
sufficiently to have made them his own – and he simply stated what he thought, without citing 
sources.  It should be recalled that conventions for citations were only then taking shape and 
that James was among the leaders in this regard.  In any case, as Holmes himself (1870/1892b) 
readily admitted, “Honest thinkers are always stealing unconsciously from each other.  Our 
minds are full of waifs and strays which we think are our own.  Innocent plagiarism turns up 
everywhere” (p. 287).  He never recorded a sense that James had done anything improper in 
using ideas similar to his own without citing him. 
As regards other probable sources for James’s I-Me distinction, it is relevant to note that 
James, like Peirce, was a devoted reader of Shakespeare’s work.  (Indeed, his interest in 
Shakespeare was stimulated by Peirce as well as by Francis Child during his years in the 
Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard.)  James was also a frequent reader of Robert 
Browning’s dramatic monologues.  It seems quite likely that Browning as well as Shakespeare 
inspired James’s views – and provided powerful illustrations – of the dialogical character of 
self-reflection (Leary, 2004, 2005). 
In addition, James was familiar with Thomas Carlyle’s discussion of “ME” in Sartor 
Resartus (1833-34/1987, p. 129) as well as the dialectical reasoning associated with Hegel and 
other idealists.  At minimum, these were important contextual or background factors with 
regard to his incipiently dialogical thinking. 
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conversationalist.  It seems fitting – and not at all a coincidence – that our contemporary 
notions of the dialogical self can be traced to two great conversationalists.3 
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